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INTRODUCTION
More people currently use the Internet to trade securities than to
purchase books, CDs or any other products online.1 Online trading is
the method by which an investor uses a computer to place either a
buy or sell securities order, electronically, through a broker’s Internet
site.2  Although online trading has only been in existence since 1995,
it has already revolutionized the brokerage industry.3  In particular,
online trading offers investors a number of advantages over
                                                                
1. See Joel Dreyfuss, Facts about the Online Investor (last visited Nov. 28, 2000)
available at http://pathfinder.com/money/onlineinvesting/start/gs7.html; see also
Peter C. McMahon, Securities Law and the Internet:  Enforcement Issues, in SECURITIES
LAW & THE INTERNET, at 265, 273 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 1127, 1999) (citing Leah Nathans Spiro, Who Needs A Broker?, BUS. WK., Feb. 22,
1999, at 113) (stating that the popularity of online trading is topped only by that of
online pornography).
2. See Laura S. Unger, On-Line Brokerage:  Keeping Apace of Cyberspace 11 (Nov.
1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/spstindx.htm [hereinafter Cyberspace];
Hardy Callcott, Memorandum from Charles Schwab & Co. to Frank G. Zarb,
Chairman, NASD and Mary L. Schapiro, President, NASDR, Inc., Suitability
Obligations in Internet Investing, 4 (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing].
3. See Blake Bell, Online Trading Losses and Suitability Claims Against Ebrokers, 2
NO. 9 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM:  SEC. ELEC. AGE 18, *1 (1999) (“Online securities
trading is experiencing explosive growth.”); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 11 (explaining
that in 1995 broker-dealers introduced the first systems enabling individuals to place
buy and sell orders over the Internet and subsequently, in less than five years, online
trading has become an important part of brokers’ service offerings); On-Line Trading:
Better Investor Protection Information Needed on Brokers’ Web Sites 3 (GAO/GGD-00-43 May
2000) [hereinafter Better Investor Protection] (“On-line trading is transforming the
relationships that investors have with broker-dealers.”); Laura S. Unger, Remarks at
the American Conference Institute’s National Conference on Securities Trading on
the Internet, Customer Expectations Online:  Are They Your Obligations? 1 (Jan. 25, 1999)
[hereinafter Customer Exceptions Online] (noting that while there were no online
brokers prior to 1995, online brokers accounted for 25% of all trades on the New
York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ in 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch249.htm; Laura Unger, Remarks at the
Practicing Law Institute’s SEC Speaks, How Best Can SEC.gov Regulate Securities.com? 1
(Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Can SEC.gov Regulate Securities.com] (noting that the Wall
Street Journal publishes an article involving online trading almost every day), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch257.htm.
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traditional offline trading, including lower fees and the ability to
access account information and industry data at any time from their
personal computers.4
Online trading, however, has its shortcomings.5  For example, the
United States Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) received over
3,000 complaints against online brokers in fiscal year 1999, which is
an increase of almost 200% over fiscal year 1998 and about a 1200%
increase over complaints received in fiscal year 1997.6  One concern is
that online brokers could potentially entice unsophisticated
individual investors7 to trade online and encourage investment
                                                                
4. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 16 (explaining that online investors can access
market information, investment information and other tools via the Internet);
Douglas Schulz, Internet Trading Take A Walk On The Wild Side, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 1999:  SETTLEMENTS, LAPTOPS, EXPERTS & ARBITRATORS, at 229, 233 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 0092, 1999) (discussing the
benefits of online trading, such as 24 hour access and lower fees).
5. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, E-Trade’s Growing Pains, WASH. POST, June 18, 2000,
at H1 [hereinafter E-Trade Growing Pains] (noting that the SEC and NASD “say
online trading has come to account for the majority of consumer grievances”);
Sandra Sugawara, Studies Address Online Trading; More Disclosure, Consumer Education
Needed, Reports Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at E1 (explaining that recent studies
discuss the benefits from online trading while addressing evolving problems with the
industry).
6. See Laura Unger, Investing in the Internet Age:  What You Should Know and What
Your Computer May Not Tell You . . . , Remarks at the Association of Retired Persons
National Legislative Council Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 2 (Feb. 3, 2000)
(explaining that customer complaints about online brokers have increased
dramatically, but that this increase may be in part because more investors use online
brokers), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch342.htm; see also
Arthur Levitt, Plain Talk About On-line Investing, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (1999)
[hereinafter Plain Talk About On-line Investing] (stating that the SEC has inspected
firms that represent 80% of market share for the online trading industry); Securities
and Exchange Commission, Statement by Chairman Arthur Levitt Concerning On-line
Trading 1 (Jan. 27, 1999) (noting that over the last two years the SEC has become
aware of growing concerns about retail, online investing), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/levonlin.htm.
7. A number of factors should be considered in determining an investor’s level
of sophistication.  See Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L. REV. 1081, 1083 (noting that courts often treat
unsophisticated and sophisticated investors differently).  These factors include:
“1) financial and business acumen, 2) individual characteristics of sophistication, and
3) investment-specific behavior.”  Id. at 1149.  Each of these broad categories also
contain relevant considerations, none of which should in themselves be
determinative.  See id.  For example, the most important general category, financial
and business acumen, includes the following additional factors:  investment
experience; professional status; history of speculative investments; government or
business experience; professional experience in the securities industry; and general
familiarity with securities transactions.  See id. at 1149-50.  Factors under individual
characteristics of sophistication include:  understanding trading in an investment
account; education; special access to information; intelligence; age and; wealth and
income.  See id. at 1150.  Investment specific behavior examines how an investor
behaves with respect to his or her investments.  See id.  Elements to consider in this
category include:  regular consultation with investment professionals; number of
brokerage accounts; stock club membership; amount of money invested; scrutiny
over investment accounts; attending investment conferences; subscribing to financial
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purchases that are not appropriate for such investors.8  Under
current law, all broker-dealers, whether online or traditional, may
only recommend the purchase of a specific security that is suitable for
the customer based on the customer’s investment objectives and
individual needs.9  This legal obligation, known as “suitability,” is one
of the most important, yet nebulous doctrines under the federal
securities laws.10  The parameters of the suitability doctrine become
even more indefinite when applied in the online trading context.11
                                                                
or investment journals; viewing financial television programming; and reviewing
confirmation slips or monthly statements.  See id. at 1149.
8. See Plain Talk About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at 1096 (discussing
concerns about the influx of new, inexperienced investors who maybe “seduced” to
trade online in a manner that is not appropriate for them).
Online firms try to minimize the level of responsibility they have for their
customers’ trades by arguing that online customers are sophisticated and
knowledgeable because they are trading via an online broker.  See Schulz, supra note
4, at 240 (stating that this type of assumption of sophistication is not unlike the belief
that because an individual has money, he or she must be a sophisticated investor).
This assumption is fallacious insofar as many online investors are rather naïve about
investing.  See id. at 240.  See generally Schulz, supra note 4, at 233 (discussing that
more individual investors are able to enter the stock market with the help of online
trading); Ruth Simon & Rebecca Buckman, Can Brokerage Advice and Internet Mix?,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at C1 (reporting that as online trading’s popularity
explodes, a debate has escalated over who is responsible for protecting investors who
place orders themselves via the Internet); Laura S. Unger, Does the Internet Empower or
Just Excite Investors? 3 (Sept. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Does the Internet Empower] (asking
how far online firms should have to go to get investors to consider the risks of buying
and selling securities), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch294.htm;
Michael K. Wolensky, Securities Law And The Internet Enforcement Issues:  Application of
Suitability Obligations, in SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET, at 251, 253 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 00BS, 1999) (finding that smaller investors
are able to utilize online brokerages to trade stocks).
9. See NASD Conduct Rule 2310, NASD Manual (CCH) 4261 (Apr. 1997)
(stating that an online securities dealer “shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable” for the investor); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels &
Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1557
(1999); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 24; Wolensky, supra note 8, at 254 (explaining that
a broker who recommends a particular security to a particular customer must be
satisfied that the security is suitable to the investor’s financial ability and investment
objectives).
10. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1557 (establishing that the
doctrine is “somewhat nebulous and amorphous with respect to its content and
parameters”); see also Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments For That Little Old
Lady:  A Realistic Role For Modern Portfolio Theory Assessing Suitability Obligations of
Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 189 (1998) (discussing that the genesis of the
suitability requirement lies with self regulatory organizations (“SRO”)); Plain Talk
About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at 1095 (noting that in the midst of enthusiasm
over online trading, online brokers cannot lose sight of the fundamental obligations
owed to customers).
11. See Laura S. Unger, Remarks at the National Regulatory Services Fall 1999
Compliance Conference (Sept. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Unger’s Compliance Conference
Remarks] (stating that the most important issue arising from the explosion of online
trading thus far appears to be determining what suitability obligations online brokers
have to their customers), available at http://sec.gov/news/speeches/spch296.htm;
Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing that pinpointing what constitutes a
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A number of disenchanted online investors have begun alleging
suitability violations in arbitration complaints, which demonstrates
the growing confusion surrounding online suitability issues.12  For
example, in May of 1999, Lael Desmond, a twenty-seven year old
graduate student from Indianapolis, Indiana, convinced a three-
person National Association of Securities Dealers’ (“NASD”)
arbitration panel that Ameritrade Holding should pay him fees and
compensatory damages after he lost $40,000 trading stock with the
online broker.13  Desmond claimed that Ameritrade allowed him to
make investments that were unsuitable for him based on his
experience and financial situation.14  Desmond lost money for his
medical school tuition when he traded stocks on margin.15  Like many
                                                                
recommendation is more difficult online).
12. See RJ, Everybody is Talking about Suitability in Qualifying Online Investors—Except
Online Firms, SEC. WK., Vol. 26, No. 42 (discussing an Indianapolis law firm’s
statement that in the last year it filed seven or eight arbitration claims for
unsophisticated investors who overtraded online accounts); see also Bell, supra note 3,
at *2, *3 (stating that the number of suitability claims will most likely increase as the
number of online investors increase); Arthur Levitt, Investors Town Meeting,
Cleveland, Ohio, Investing With Your Eyes Open (July 25, 2000) (explaining his
concern that investors do not seem to know the basic, but important fundamentals of
investing), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch393.htm.  See generally
E-Trade to Pay Customer for Order Gone Awry (Aug. 7, 2000) (noting that the NASD
handled 55 arbitration cases involving online trading disputes last year), available at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/000807/n07120666.html.
13. See Rebecca Buckman, Student Awarded $40,000 From Firm in Trading Case,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at C16 [hereinafter Student Awarded $40,000] (noting that
the NASD letter and award did not detail the panel’s reason for the decision); James
Kim, Should Online Brokerages Curb Risky Trades? Some Investors Blame Internet Services for
Losses, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2000, at 1B (stating that Desmond’s lawyer argued that
Ameritrade should not have let his client trade in the manner he did); see also
Rebecca Buckman & Aaron Lucchetti, Cooling It:  Wall Street Firms Try To Keep Internet
Mania From Ending Badly, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1999, at A1 (explaining that Desmond
opened an account with Ameritrade in 1997 because he thought it was a way to make
a lot of money quickly).  See generally Danielle Fugazy, Brokerage:  Ameritrade Loses
Arbitration Case, WEB FIN., Feb. 14, 2000 (noting that, as is typical with NASD
arbitration awards, the Desmond decision carries limited precedential value),
available at 2000 WL 4044301.
14. See Student Awarded $40,000, supra note 13, at C16 (noting that Desmond also
alleged a variety of other claims, including that Ameritrade was negligent, conducted
unauthorized trading and participated in “unreasonable business conduct”).  But see
Fugazy, supra note 13 (reporting that Ameritrade has commented that the Desmond
case has been mischaracterized as a suitability case when it is really a margin sell-out
case).
15. See Eileen Ambrose, Buying stocks on Margin Can be Risky, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb.
27, 2000, at 1D (explaining that, as seen in the Desmond case, the downside of
trading on margin is that the investor’s losses can be amplified); Gretchen
Morgenson, Page Buying on Margin Becomes a Habit; Investors Turn to Credit in a Bull
Market, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Mar. 24, 2000, at C1 (discussing that the investor’s
stock serves as the asset backing the loan from the broker, and thus, when the value
of the stock declines the customer must add more money to their account or risk
having the broker sell their stock to obtain the money owed to them), available at
2000 WL 19065635; Student Awarded $40,000, supra note 13, at C16 (stating that
investors who trade on margin use borrowed funds to increase the amount of capital
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novice investors, Desmond did not understand the concept of trading
on margin.16
Shortly after Desmond filed his suit, Kathleen Kourie, a button and
trim salesperson in New York’s garment industry, filed a complaint
with the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) against Charles Schwab
& Co.17  Kourie claimed that Charles Schwab violated suitability
requirements by allowing her to make a $265,000 trade when she
only had $50,000 in her Schwab account.18
More investor suits, similar to Desmond’s and Kourie’s, are likely to
occur if the stock market declines.19  A market decline could result in
severe financial losses for many online investors.20  These
disenchanted online investors may expend even more resources
                                                                
that they have to invest in stocks).
A margin account is defined as a “brokerage account allowing customers to buy
securities with money borrowed from the broker.  Margin accounts are governed by
REGULATION T, by the NASD, by the NYSE, and by individual brokerage house rules.
Margin requirements can be met with cash or with eligible securities.”  D ICTIONARY
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 344 (5th ed. 1998).
16. See Buckman & Lucchetti, supra note 13, at A1 (discussing that Desmond did
not know what trading on margin was and thought that it was similar to taking out a
bank loan in the way that it would require regular payments).
17. See Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1.  The NYSE, another Self
Regulatory Organization (“SRO”), has rules that embody the suitability doctrine.  See
Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1571.  The NYSE’s “know your customer
rule,” Rule 405, does not require a recommendation like the NASD’s rule and
instead applies to “every customer, every order, every cash or margin account.”  See
id. (acknowledging that the “NYSE does not have a suitability rule per se”); NYSE
Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405, at 3696 (Aug. 1999).
The SEC, however, relied on NASD precedents relating to the suitability doctrine
in cases like In re Rangen.  See Exchange Act Release No. 38,486, 64 SEC Docket 731
(Apr. 8, 1997).  One commentator notes that this cross-citing of authorities raises
support for the use of the NASD suitability rule.  See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra
note 9, at 1577.
18. See Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1 (reporting on claim by Kourie that
“Charles Schwab & Co. allowed her to make an unsuitable investment by executing
trades for $265,000 in shares of theglobe.com when the net worth of her account was
just $50,000”).
19. See Bell, supra note 3, at *1 (commenting that, with the tremendous growth of
online trading, there is likely to be a growing number of suitability claims against
online brokers after online traders suffer losses); Scott Bernard Nelson, Thorny Issues
Arise Over Protections For Online Investors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2000, at A1 (quoting
the executive director of the North American Securities Administrators Association,
Marc Beauchamp, who says that there is a “good chance there will be a slew of cases
like [Desmond’s]”).
20. See Judith Burns, Regulators, Entrepreneurs See Gains From Online Trading, DOW
JONES BUS. NEWS, June 22, 1999 (reporting that SEC Commissioner Laura Unger
stated she did not know what will happen to online brokerage use if the market takes
a downturn, but that perhaps some investors will turn back to full service brokers);
Megan Barnett, Edward Jones:  The Last Not-Com Brokerage, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 7,
2000 (“At the first real downturn, the do-it-yourselfers are going to be in total
disarray.”); cf. Does the Internet Empower, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing that investor
optimism has reached record levels and has skewed investors’ perspectives of risk,
thus heightening the possibility that many investors are currently holding securities
that are too risky for their financial situations).
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suing their broker.  The way in which regulators apply the suitability
doctrine online will affect the level of protection investors receive.21
Regulators, however, are faced with the challenge of balancing
investor protection with investor abuse because online investors may
attempt to use the suitability doctrine as an insurance policy for poor
investment choices.  The clarification of suitability obligations online
may curtail the number of investor claims brought following a severe
market downturn.22
This Comment discusses how broker’s online activities become
subject to suitability obligations as articulated in NASD and NYSE
rules.23  More specifically, this Comment explores the issue of when a
broker makes a recommendation via the Internet, and thus, triggers
the NASD’s suitability obligation.  In addition, this Comment will
recommend that, because of certain characteristics specific to online
trading, online brokers should monitor their unsophisticated clients’
online trades to ensure that each trade is suitable for the investor.
In analyzing these issues, this Comment will first provide a history
of online trading and note how it differs from day trading.
Additionally, this Comment will define suitability and discuss the
purpose of suitability obligations, focusing on the NASD suitability
requirement.  Second, this Comment will examine some of the
characteristics of online brokers to determine whether additional
protection for online investors is warranted.  Third, considering the
characteristics of online brokers, this Comment will discuss
approaches to ensure there is adequate protection for online
investors and advocate suitability checks for all unsophisticated
online investors.
I. BACKGROUND OF ONLINE TRADING AND SUITABILITY OBLIGATIONS
A. The Explosive Growth of Online Trading
Since 1995, online trading has grown dramatically, both in the
                                                                
21. See Does the Internet Empower, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing that how broadly or
narrowly suitability obligations are applied to online brokers will influence how
effective the rule is at protecting investors).
22. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1575 (noting that “the line
between conduct which is suitable and conduct which is unsuitable under SRO rules
remains ambiguous and uncertain”).
23. For an explanation of the difference between the NYSE Rules and the NASD
Rules regarding suitability obligations, see Michael J. Hogan & Richard H. Neiman,
Electronic/Online Brokerage Regulating Cyberspace, in STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW E-COMMERCE ECONOMY, at 33, 39 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. B0-00E5, 1999).
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availability of services and the number of customers.24  Currently,
approximately 160 brokers offer online trading and more than
10,000 Internet Websites execute online trades.25 The explosion of
online trading is due in part because it is less expensive, more
convenient and faster to execute trades online than through a
traditional broker.26  The features available on brokers’ Websites,
such as research, market information and investment tools, also have
contributed to online trading’s popularity.27
Industry professionals state that online trading has democratized
America’s capital markets by enabling an increased number of
middle-class Americans to participate in the stock market.28  With the
                                                                
24. See Laura S. Unger, The Net Changes Everything . . . Or at Least a Few Things, 2
No. 12 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM:  SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE, at *1 (1999)
[hereinafter The Net Changes Everything] (“The phenomenal growth in online
brokerage is particularly astonishing when you consider that it did not exist in
1995.”); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that the first system allowing online
trading began in 1995).
The number of online customers has dramatically increased.  U.S. Bancorp Piper
Jaffray (“Piper Jaffray”) assessed that there were 9.7 million online accounts by the
end of the second quarter of 1999.  See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 1 (highlighting the
drastic growth in the industry by explaining that there were 3.7 million online
accounts in 1997 and 7.3 million in 1998) (citing U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray, On-line
Financial Services Update 11 (Sept. 1999)).  In fact, trades placed online now account
for 25% of all trades on the NYSE and Nasdaq. See Customer Expectations Online, supra
note 3, at 1; see also Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing a study by U.S. Bancorp
Piper Jaffray concluding that in 1998 online broker-dealers 37% of all retail equities
trades and options trades).  Jupiter Communications calculated that in 1998,
investors held $415 billion in assets in online accounts.  See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at
12 (citing Jupiter Communications:  $3 Trillion in Assets by 2003 in Online Brokerage
Accounts, But Customer Service Still Lacking (Sept. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.com/jupiter/press/releases/1990/0901.html).
25. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 11; Tracey Longo, Keeping Online In Line:  Online
Brokerages Say They’re Not Subject to Suitability Requirements, But Regulators May Argue
Otherwise, FIN. PLANNING, July 1, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 7351388.
26. See Laura Unger, Empowering Investors in an Electronic Age, Remarks at IOSCO
Annual Conference, Sydney Australia (May 17, 2000) (“The ease of internet access,
the unprecedented availability of on-line investment information and reduced
transaction costs have empowered individual investors to enter the financial markets
in record numbers.”), available at  http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch380.htm;
see also Better Investor Protection, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing that some of online
trading’s attractive features include low fees and free company research); Burns,
supra note 20 (“‘It’s cheaper, it’s faster, it’s more efficient’ to use online brokerage
firm.”).  
27. See Better Investor Protection, supra note 26, at 27.  Online brokers provide a
variety of information on their sites, including Web links to research providing a
recommendation.  See id.  Some firms charge “customers for general stock
recommendations by specific industry or risk category.”  Id.  Some regulators are
concerned that some investors may believe that this information is a
recommendation by their broker.  See id.  See generally Sam Scott Miller, Online Brokers:
The Next NASDR Target?, SD44 ALI-ABA 1, *3 (1999) (explaining that computer
technology and the Internet has enabled growth in online financial services).
28. See Good Morning America Report:  Trading Stocks Over the Internet (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 18, 1999) (discussing that the stock market is no longer just
for wealthy professionals, in part, because of new online trading technologies which
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ability to execute a trade for as little as five dollars,29 online trading is
particularly attractive to smaller investors who may not have been
able to afford to pay the higher fees associated with traditional,
“offline” brokerages.30  In fact, some online brokers have started
offering free trades.31
The growth of online trading is expected to continue. Forrester
Research believes there will be 20.4 million online accounts by 2003.32
These accounts are expected to hold $3 trillion in investor assets,
which is a sevenfold increase from 1998.33  The increased number of
online accounts will contribute to revenue growth for the online
brokerage industry, which the Securities Industry Association (“SIA”)
predicts to exceed $5 billion by the year 2001.34  Another factor that
will contribute to online trading’s continued growth is the increasing
number of industry players.35  Although discount brokerages were the
first to establish online trading sites, full service firms, like Merrill
Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney, Prudential Securities and
PaineWebber, entered the online arena after witnessing online
brokerages’ growing market shares.36
                                                                
allow “everyday people” to invest); Plain Talk About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at
1102; Mary L. Schapiro, President of the NASD Regulation, Inc., Speech at the
Society of American Business Editors and Writers Conference (Nov. 17, 1998) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Schapiro Speech] (describing that the new typical
investor makes less than $70,000 per year and 38% of new investors are non-
professionals); see also Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 12 (stating online investors have a
median age of 41 and median income of $73,800).
29. See Brian A. Carlis et al., The True Cost of Internet Investing, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 1999:  SETTLEMENTS, LAPTOPS, EXPERTS & ARBITRATORS, at 175, 180 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 0092, 1999) (noting the
inexpensive fees associated with online trading).
30. See The Net Changes Everything, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that online trading
greatly impacts smaller investors’ ability to participate in the stock market); Carlis,
supra note 29, at 180 (discussing that investors can trade online for as little as $5.00 a
trade, although online trades fluctuate and can cost up to approximately $30.00 a
trade); David Lipton, Risky Business:  D.C. News Headlines and Internet Stock Trading,
CONTACT (The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law), Summer
1999, at 17, 18 (stating that online trading fees are as low as $6.00 or $7.00 a trade).
31. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Web Brokers Begin to Offer No-Commission Stock Trades,
June 19, 2000, at C1 (noting that Ameritrade, FinancialCafe.com and FreeTradez
offer certain online trading for free); see also E-Trade Growing Pains, supra note 5, at
H1 (discussing that E*Trade offers customers promotions like frequent-flier miles
and points with big hotel chains).
32. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 17 (projecting that by 2003, 9.7 million U.S.
households will manage online accounts).
33. See id.
34. See Longo, supra note 25, at *1 (stating that online sales revenues were $1.2
billion in 1997).
35. See Carol McGinn, Online Brokers Link Front, Back Office, WALL ST. & TECH.,
Apr. 1, 1999, at 14 (noting that more and more firms are jumping on the online
trading bandwagon); Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1.
36. See Robert Sales, Uncharted Waters:  Brokerages Wade Into Web Trading, WALL ST.
& TECH. at 4045 (July 1, 1999).  One reason full service brokerage firms hesitated to
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B. Online Trading versus Day-Trading:  Distinguishing Between Two
Different Types of Investment Activities
Although day traders and online traders both use computers to
execute trades, these two types of investors are distinct.  Day traders
and online investors typically have different investment objectives.37
According to a recent report issued by the North American Securities
Administrators Association (“NASAA”), a day trader is a retail
customer of a brokerage firm who attempts to make daily profits by
executing frequent trades to take advantage of small changes in a
stock’s price.38  Consequently, day traders’ transactions, typically
placed through a day trading firm, must be executed quickly to take
advantage of small price changes.39  Through frequent trading, day
                                                                
enter the online environment is the impersonal nature of the Internet, which seems
inconsistent with the type of personalized investment advice full service brokerages
provide.  See id.  Full service brokerages generate revenue by providing customers
with recommendations on what investment instruments to purchase, processing
orders, and/or by managing customers’ funds on a discretionary basis.  See id.
Therefore, the firm makes all the investment decisions for a customer’s brokerage
account.  See id.  Discount brokerages create revenue by executing customer’s trades
and are far less likely to make recommendations to customers and do not permit
discretionary accounts.  See Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1.
37.
At the outset, NASAA believes that a distinction must be drawn between
online investing and day trading.  Too often the news media use these
descriptors interchangeably, when in fact they are distinct market segments
although some commonality may exist.  Definitions of these terms are of
course not included in the securities laws or orders and sometimes the two
areas may blur together.
NASAA’S Letter to Committee on Commerce, in SECURITIES LAW & THE INTERNET:  DOING
BUSINESS IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING MARKETPLACE, at 909, 911 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. 00BS, 1999).  See Day Trading:  An Overview:  Hearing
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 106th Cong. 55 (1999) [hereinafter Levitt Day Trading Testimony] (prepared
testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC) (exploring the differences
between day traders and online traders), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testmony/tsty2199.htm.
An additional difference between the day trading industry and the online trading
industry is size.  The day trading industry is considerably smaller than the online
brokerage industry.  See Saul S. Cohen, The Empire Strikes Back, Part I:  The War Against
Day Trading, 2 No. 12 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM:  SECURITIES IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE 9,
*3 (1999).  The NASAA reports there are 62 active day trading firms that operate a
total of 287 branches.  See North American Securities Administrators Association
Project Group on Day Trading, Report of the Day Trading Project Group:  Findings and
Recommendations, at 7 (Aug. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Day Trading Project].  The Electronic
Traders Association (“ETA”) reports that there are approximately 4,000 to 5,000 full
time day traders and about 225,000 people who use the Internet to day trade on a
part-time basis.  See Cohen, supra, at *1.  Full time day traders account for a total of
150,000 to 200,000 trades per day which is about 15% of Nasdaq’s volume.  See id. at
*2.
38. See Day Trading Project, supra note 37, at 5, 7.
39. See Levitt Day Trading Testimony, supra note 37 (explaining that online brokers
provide “real time” stock quotations, but do not provide “real time” links to major
stock markets and the Nasdaq, like day trading firms, and therefore, unlike day
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traders attempt to generate quick profits.40  In contrast, online
investors typically aim to leave their money invested for a longer
period of time, hoping to make a profit at some point in the future.41
As such, the speed of trade execution is not as critical to many online
investors.42  Online investors, however, typically execute trades more
often than investors who use traditional “offline” brokers.43
These two types of investors also differ in the degree of risk they
expect to undertake.  In his or her quest for quick returns, a day
trader takes on a substantially higher degree of risk than the average
online investor.44  Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC, stated that
                                                                
traders, online traders do not have the power to directly access market operated
order execution systems and execute their trades within seconds).
40. See Levitt Day Trading Testimony, supra note 37 (commenting that it is difficult
to define clearly a day trader or day trading, but noting that the differences can be
seen by examining the spectrum of investors from those who hold investments for a
longer period of time to those who engage in rapid-fire buying and selling,
sometimes only owning a stock for a matter of seconds); Securities and Exchange
Commission, Investor Tips:  Day Trading:  Your Dollars at Risk (Sept. 27, 2000)
[hereinafter Day Trading:  Your Dollars at Risk] (discussing that day traders are not
“investors,” like online traders, because they often only own stocks for minutes or
even seconds and never own stocks overnight because of the extreme risk of
overnight negative price fluctuations), available at http://www.sec.gov/consumer/
daytips.htm.
41. The NASAA notes that online investors may execute a day trade by buying
and selling the same security within the same day, through an online broker’s
website, even though they do not have the same advantages provided by firms that
cater to a day trading strategy.  A day trader, however, is not and cannot be an
investor.  See NASAA’S Letter to Committee on Commerce, supra note 37, at 912.
42. The speed of trade execution is still very important to online brokers and
some investors may even try to use an online broker to carry out a day trading or
part-time day trading strategy.  See generally Gaston F. Ceron, Direct-Access Trading
Expected to Move Online Investing to the Next Generation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2000
(discussing new direct-access technology that will allow online traders to access the
markets directly without going through a broker).  The Direct-Access article goes on to
discuss that the use of direct-access technology is not for everyone because “it
requires a level of understanding and a level of knowledge in order to benefit fully
from it and to use it safely.” Id.
43. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Online Investors:  Do the Slow Die First?,
at 24 (Dec. 1999) (draft version) (finding that investors begin trading more actively
when they switch to an online broker, after using a traditional, “offline” broker),
available at http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/~odean/papers/Online/Online.html; see
also John Reed Stark, Securities Regulation and the Internet, in SECOND ANNUAL INTERNET
LAW INSTITUTE, at 793, 801 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course, Handbook Series No. G0-001, 1998) (“Online investors also tend to
be more active, holding larger positions, making bigger trades, and enjoying better
discounts trading through a computer than they could obtain by trading through a
full-service broker.”).
44. Typically, day traders expose themselves to even more risk by trading on
margin.  Trading on margin means an investor uses borrowed funds to purchase
stocks.  More specifically, when an investor trades on margin they borrow cash
against the value of the securities that they own to purchase more stock.  By using
borrowed funds an investor hopes to magnify profits, but trading on margin also
increases an investor’s risk exposure. If the stock the investor is using to borrow
against decreases in value, the loss can be compounded and the investor will be
required to make a margin call, which means he or she must put up more cash or
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individuals who wish to engage in day trading should understand that
day trading poses a significant risk of financial loss; therefore,
individuals should not trade with funds they cannot afford to lose.45
One study by a Florida investment consultant concluded that only
11.5% of individuals using a day trading strategy were able to turn a
profit.46
C. Suitability Obligations Under NASD and NYSE Rules
Suitability is a doctrine that requires brokers to recommend only
those securities purchases that are suitable to an investor’s financial
needs.47  In securities arbitration claims, suitability is the most
frequently cited securities industry standard.48  The suitability
doctrine emerged because, in broker-customer relationships,
                                                                
risk that his or her securities will be sold.  See NASD Notice to Members 98-102,
Calculating Margin for Day-Trading and Cross-Guaranteed Accounts (Dec. 1998)
(providing detailed discussion of margin-related issues); Day Trading:  Your Dollars at
Risk, supra note 40, at 2.
The practice of trading on margin exposes an investor to the possibility of losing
more than he or she originally invested.  Trading on margin is not exclusive to the
day trading industry and some online traders may also choose to trade on margin.
Because of the speed with which day traders move in and out of particular securities,
the NASD stated in a December 1998 Notice to Members that day traders must trade
using a margin account because day trading in a cash account could amount to free
riding, which occurs when an individual purchases a security and then sells it prior to
actually paying for the initial purchase.  See NASD Notice to Members 98-102 (Dec.
1998); Day Trading:  Your Dollars at Risk, supra note 41, at 2.
45. See Levitt Day Trading Testimony, supra note 37, at 1.  The chief of licensing at
the Massachusetts Securities Division stated that “day trading isn’t investing, it’s at
best speculating[,] . . . most traders will lose all of their money.”  State Securities
Regulators Highlight Problems with Day Trading, Press Release by the North
America Securities Administrators Association, Aug. 9, 1999 <http://www.nasaa.org/
whoweare/media/dtreportrelease.htm>.
46. See Day Trading Project, supra note 37, at 6; see also Ronald L. Johnson, Day
Trading:  An Analysis of Public Day Trading at a Retail Day Trading Firm (Aug. 9, 1999)
(reporting that numerous studies have shown that market timing is not possible,
“even for professional money mangers”), available at http://www.nasaa.org/
RJReportFinal.html.
47. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1557 (noting that suitability
requires the matching of the investment needs of a particular client with the
characteristics of a recommended security); Wolensky, supra note 8, at 254
(describing the suitability doctrine as a broker’s duty to recommend to a customer
only those securities that are suitable to the peculiar needs of that particular
customer); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that “suitability refers to a
broker-dealer’s obligation to recommend only those specific investments that are
suitable for its customers.”).
48. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1557 (noting that in 1998
unsuitability claims accounted for 95% of filings under NASD “errors and omissions”
insurance policies); Rapp, supra note 9, at 189 (noting that the suitability
requirement is the most frequently cited standard in the securities industry); Simon
& Buckman, supra note 8, at C19 (stating that the NASD received 1,104 arbitration
claims based on suitability violations last year, but they are not sure how many of
these claims relate to online trading).  See generally Wolensky, supra note 8, at 254
(describing suitability as a well-established doctrine).
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customers place trust in their brokers and rely on them to
recommend only securities suitable for their financial position.49  This
concept is premised on the fact that brokers have a special
relationship with their customers that is different from the typical
merchant-customer relationship.50  The broker-customer relationship
is one of special trust and confidence approaching that of a
fiduciary.51  The suitability doctrine is rooted in a concept known as
the shingle theory.52  The shingle theory is a common law principle
stating that brokers make an implied representation to customers
when they “hang out a shingle” that they will deal with the customer
fairly.53
Self Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”), such as the NASD and the
NYSE have rules that articulate suitability obligations governing
broker-dealers.54  Currently, all broker-dealers conducting any
substantial interstate retail business are members of the NASD, and
thus abide by its suitability rules.55  As discussed below, however, what
constitutes a viable unsuitability claim under the NASD and NYSE
rules is often difficult to discern.56
                                                                
49. See Wolensky, supra note 8, at 255 (explaining that the suitability doctrine
aims to protect investors from broker sales abuses like high pressure selling).
50. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 196.
51. See id. (noting that an SEC disciplinary case described the broker-customer
relationship as one of “special trust and confidence approaching, and perhaps even
equaling, that of a fiduciary”).
52. See id. at 254 (noting the origins of the suitability doctrine).
53. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining that the shingle theory arises
from common law and provides that by virtue of hanging out a shingle as a securities
professional, a broker-dealer makes an implied representation to customers); see also
Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1271
(1995) (explaining that the shingle theory presumes that a broker-dealer who hangs
out a shingle and solicits customers makes an implied representation of fair dealing).
54. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 10.2, at 458 (3d
ed. 1996) (noting that the bulk of broker-dealer regulation is attributable to SROs);
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 868 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining that SROs
such as the NYSE and NASD play an important role in broker-dealer regulation); see
also Rapp, supra note 9, at 189 (noting that SROs such as the national securities
exchanges and the NASD articulate suitability obligations).  A qualifying SRO is
either a national exchange, like the NYSE, or a registered securities association. See
HAZEN, supra, § 10.2, at 464.
55. Broker-dealers must register with the SEC, unless they fall under an
exception, and the SEC requires that broker-dealers join the NASD.  See STEINBERG,
supra note 54, at 869.  All members of the NASD must comply with its rules and
regulations.  See id. at 869-70.  See generally HAZEN, supra note 54, at 464 (noting that
broker-dealers registered with the NASD may also be members of one or more
national exchanges); Rapp, supra note 9, at 197 (stating that the SEC established the
NASD as the only “Registered Securities Association” under the authority of Section
15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Schapiro Speech, supra note 28, at 1
(noting that the NASD is currently responsible for regulating 5,600 brokerage firms
and approximately 600,000 registered representatives).
56. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1557 (discussing that unsuitability
claims are the most common yet most ambiguous client accusations) (citing Zarb
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Under NASD Rule 2310(a), “Recommendations to Customers
(Suitability),” brokers must recommend only those securities suitable
for a particular investor.57  Rule 2310(a) states:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the
basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.58
Therefore, a broker must first make a recommendation to trigger
Rule 2310(a) and be subject to suitability obligations.59
Brokers can violate the suitability rule in two ways.60  First, a broker-
dealer can make a recommendation that is unsuitable for any
investor.61  Second, a broker may make a recommendation that is
inappropriate for a specific investor because of that investor’s wealth,
investment objectives, age, or other individual characteristics.62
The NYSE also has a rule related to the suitability doctrine,
although the term suitability is not used in the rule.63  NYSE Rule 405,
the “know your customer rule,” requires members of the NYSE to use
                                                                
Urges Broker-Dealers to ‘Be on Guard’ About Suitability, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
22, at 810 (May 29, 1998)) (noting that what constitutes a viable unsuitability claim is
open to debate).
57. See NASD Conduct Rule 2310, NASD Manual (CCH) 4261 (Apr. 1997)
(outlining NASD’s suitability rule); see also Wolensky, supra note 8, at 254 (discussing
that the suitability doctrine is outlined in NASD Rule 2310).
58. NASD Conduct Rule 2310(a), NASD Manual (CCH), at 4261; see also NYSE
Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405, at 3696 (Aug. 1999) (“Every member
organization is required . . . to use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by
such organization and every person holding power of attorney over any
account. . . .”); AMEX Rule 411, 2 Am. Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9431, at 2647
(Oct. 1995) (“Every member or member organization shall use due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer and to every order or account
accepted.”); Rapp, supra note 9, at 205-06 (noting that the NASD’s suitability rule has
emerged as the “standard of conduct and disciplinary baseline”).
59. See McMahon, supra note 1, at 277-78 (explaining that questions about when
suitability rules apply usually depend on whether the broker made a
recommendation); see also Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1560 (explaining
that the majority of authorities take the position that the suitability obligation is
imposed on a broker only in the context of a recommendation).  NASD Rule
2210(d)(2)(B) states that “in making a recommendation, whether or not labeled as
such, a member must have a reasonable basis for the recommendation.”  NASD
Conduct Rule 2210(d)(2)(B), NASD Manual (CCH) at 4174; see also Customer
Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that the outcome of a suitability
analysis will turn on the facts and circumstances of a given case).
60. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 190.
61. See id. (noting that a broker may violate the suitability rule if a
recommendation is unsuitable for any investor, regardless of the investors individual
characteristics).
62. See id.
63. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1571 (discussing the NYSE’s
“know your customer” rule).
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due diligence to attain relevant facts about every customer, every
order, every margin account accepted or carried by a member firm,
and every person holding power of attorney over any account.64
Unlike the NASD suitability rule, NYSE Rule 405, does not require a
recommendation to trigger the rule’s obligations.65
D. Suitability Doctrine Enforcement Mechanisms:  Arbitration’s Affect on
Consumer Protection
Enforcing a claim based on suitability rules, particularly in a
judicial proceeding, is difficult and presents another justification for
ensuring there are clear rules designed to protect online investors.
In particular, the lack of a private cause of action under NASD and
NYSE rules, combined with mandatory arbitration proceedings,
support the importance of ensuring SRO rules adequately protect
investors.66  First, courts have held there is no private right of action
under both NASD and NYSE rules.67  Therefore, investors generally
                                                                
64. See NYSE Rule 405(1), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2405, at 3696 (Aug. 1994);
Rapp, supra note 9, at 207 (discussing NYSE Rule 405); see also Cyberspace, supra note
2, at 25 (discussing NYSE Rule 405).
65. See NYSE Rule 405(1), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH), at 3696 (requiring that a
broker use “due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to . . . every order, every
cash or margin account”) (emphasis added); Schulz, supra note 4, at 240 (explaining
that the NYSE rule does not limit its applicability to recommendations).  See generally
AMEX Rule 411, 2 Stock Exch. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9431, at 2647 (Aug. 1995) (stating
that brokers have a duty to know and approve their customers); Rapp, supra note 9,
at 207 (explaining that the American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”) Rule 411 relates to
suitability and imposes an express requirement that a supervisory person know of the
essential facts pertaining to the customer and the nature of the account and approve
the opening of the account prior to or concurrently with any transactions occurring
in the account).
66. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 190-91 & n.7 (discussing that the SEC and SRO’s
enforce SRO rules).
67. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that there is no private of action under NYSE’s “know your customer”
rule and NASD “suitability” rule); Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 802 F. Supp. 41,
63 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (explaining that the NASD’s suitability rule is the guideline of a
private association and therefore does not provide a private right of action); Klock v.
Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 210, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that
neither the NASD’s “suitability” rule nor NYSE Rule 405, which also governs
suitability determinations, provide a private right of action); Emmons v. Merrill
Lynch, Piece, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 480, 482-83 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(explaining that under the Supreme Court’s test established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975), there is no implied private right of action under NASD rules); Klitzman v.
Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding
that there is no private right of action for violations of NASD rules); Alvod v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 848, 855-56 (D. Conn. 1980) (refusing to
imply a private right of action under securities exchange rules); Musser v. Bache &
Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,183, at 92,335-36
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (contending that there should be no private right of action for
NASD regulations because it would undermine the concept of cooperative self-
regulation which is the underlying purpose of the NASD); Parsons v. Hornblower &
Weeks-Hemphill Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482, 494 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (“[U]nder the clear
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cannot use courts to settle disputes pertaining to the NASD’s
suitability requirement or the NYSE’s “know your customer rule.”68
Second, virtually all brokers require customers to sign pre-dispute
arbitration agreements prior to opening a brokerage account.69  By
entering into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, customers waive
their right to commence judicial proceedings against their broker
and instead must settle disputes through arbitration.70  The Supreme
                                                                
weight of authority, there is no private right of action for alleged violations of NASD
rules in the absence of facts which demonstrate fraud, independently cognizable
under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.”); Zagari v. Dean Witter & Co.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,777, at 90,812 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (contending that implying a private right of action for SRO or exchange rules
would hamper self-regulation by creating a fear of damaging liability); see also HAZEN,
supra note 54, § 10.6, at 504 (explaining that it is unlikely that a violation of an
exchange’s and/or a SRO’s suitability doctrine will provide an independent basis for
private relief by an injured investor); Christopher Q. King & Steven L. Merouse,
Claims Arising From Market Volatility, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998:  REDEFINING
PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES, at 9, 18 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. 1062, 1998) (noting that SRO and exchange rules do not provide a private
course of action).  But see Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir.
1991) (finding that where there is proof of a churning violation, i.e., where a broker
excessively trades a customer’s account, the suitability requirement will give rise to a
private cause of action).
Although NASD’s suitability requirement does not generally provide individuals a
private right of action, investors can bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
their online broker.  See HAZEN, supra note 54, § 10.6, at 500 (noting that broker-
dealers are subject to fiduciary obligations).  Courts analyze three elements to
determine if there is a breach of fiduciary duty.  The court will examine:  (1) whether
a fiduciary duty exists, (2) the scope of the duty, and (3) whether the conduct
involved breached such a duty.  See id. at 501.  Courts examine fiduciary duty claims
on a case-by-case basis and heavily rely upon the facts of each case.  See id. at 500; see
also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the
relationship between a broker and customer may become fiduciary on an ad hoc
basis).  See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1591-92 (discussing state
unsuitability claims for breach of fiduciary duty).
68. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Bell, supra note 3, at *5
(noting that investors can base a suitability claim on the SEC’s Rule 10(b)(5), but
that it is highly unlikely that a court will find any online broker responsible under
this rule, in part, because of its scienter and loss causation requirement).
69. See Securities Arbitration:  Actions Needed to Address Problem of Unpaid Awards, at
14 (GAO/GGD-00-115, June 2000) [hereinafter Securities Arbitration] (explaining that
brokers generally have customers sign a pre-dispute arbitration clause when they
open an brokerage account); see also Janet E. Kerr, The Arbitration of Securities Law
Disputes after Rodriguez and the Impact on Investors Protection, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 256
(1989) (noting that many brokerage firms make clients sign pre-dispute arbitration
agreements prior to receiving service); Thomas Mulligan, E-Brokerages Face Backlash
After “Margin” Debacle, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2000, at C1 (noting that lawsuits against
brokers are difficult because brokerage firms require their customers to sign
agreements that they will settle disputes in arbitration, rather than in court).
70. See Karimu F. Hill-Harvey, How Arbitrators Decide, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
1999:  SETTLEMENTS, LAPTOPS, EXPERTS & ARBITRATORS, at 547, 550-51 (PLI Corp. L.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1131, 1999) (explaining that arbitration is
final and binding and subject to judicial review only on a limited basis); Securities
Arbitration, supra note 69, at 6, 14 (describing arbitration procedures).
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Court has upheld these pre-dispute arbitration agreements.71
Many have criticized the arbitration process as being pro-industry
and anti-investor,72 as investors are not afforded the protections that
formal judicial proceedings provide.73  In addition, arbitrators are not
bound by precise legal standards, and therefore, arbitrators look to
SRO rules, industry custom, and concepts of equity and fairness for
guidance.74  Hence, arbitration awards have little, if any, precedential
value.75  On the other hand, the bulletins issued by the NASD, known
as NASD Notice to Members, can provide guidance relating to
brokers’ obligations to investors.76
                                                                
71. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a customer and a broker-
dealer.  See 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding that the McMahons have no right to
commence judicial proceedings for a § 10(b) and RICO claim against their broker
after they agreed to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement); see also Timothy J.
O’Connor, The Use of NASD Notice to Members Bulletins as Precedent in Arbitration
Proceedings, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1998:  REDEFINING PRACTICES AND TECHNIQUES,
at 253, 257 (PLI Corp. L. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1061, 1998) (noting
that since the Supreme Court ruling in McMahon, a majority of customer claims
against brokers are resolved in arbitration proceedings rather than in courts).
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court further held that
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement was enforceable under the Securities Act.  See
490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not
undermine any of the substantive rights given by the Securities Act of 1933).
72. See STEINBERG, supra note 54, at 884 (noting that many believe securities
arbitration favors the securities industry); Kerr, supra note 69, at 256 (contending
that pre-dispute arbitration agreements may harm the securities laws investor
protection goals); Securities Arbitration, supra note 69, at 4 (discussing concern that
there is a pro-industry bias, but finding that there does not seem to be such a bias in
SRO arbitration).
73. See Kerr, supra note 69, at 256 (noting that in arbitration proceedings
discovery procedures are not utilized, the review process is limited, the Federal Rules
of Evidence are not applicable, and punitive damages are unusual); see also Securities
Arbitration, supra note 69, at 33 (finding that during 1998 brokers did not pay 49% of
arbitration awards and 12% of awards were only partially paid).
74. See Hill-Harvey, supra note 70, at 556 (explaining that arbitrators are not
bound by case precedent and statutory law, leaving arbitrators with a lot of latitude in
interpreting legal concepts); see also STEINBERG, supra note 54, at 885 (noting that
many arbitrators are not lawyers, and those who are may have little experience in
securities law).
75. See STEINBERG, supra note 54, at 885 (explaining that arbitrators are not even
required to issue a written opinion, which would explain the rationale for their
decision); see also Kerr, supra note 69, at 256 (noting that it is neither mandatory that
an arbitrator issue an opinion, nor are they required to provide the reason for the
decision).
76. See O’Connor, supra note 71, at 257-58 (explaining that some courts have
relied on NASD Notices to Members in fashioning theories of liability); see also
Harden v. Raffensperger Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1401 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying
on NASD Notice to Members to clarify broker-dealer obligations to investors);
General Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 39 F.3d 1451, 1456-57 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
a NASD Notice to Members).
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E. Online Suitability
Both online brokerage firms and regulators recognize that it is
necessary to address the question of online suitability requirements.77
Online suitability claims occur when an investor alleges that an
online broker, through its Website or other electronic
communication, prompted them to purchase a security that was
unsuitable because of the investor’s risk profile, financial needs or
fact-specific situation.78  Although some brokers argue that suitability
obligations do not apply online,79 the suitability issue is complicated
online, especially when online brokers offer, what many may
consider, personalized investment information.80  The current debate
over the application of suitability obligations in the online
environment leaves both online brokers and investors in a state of
uncertainty.  
II. ONLINE BROKERS AND SUITABILITY OBLIGATIONS:  IS THERE A
NEED FOR REGULATORS TO DO MORE TO PROTECT ONLINE INVESTORS?
To analyze whether online investors need certain specific
protections, it is necessary to examine some of the novel
characteristics associated with the online trading industry.  First,
online brokers enable a larger number of individuals to invest in
                                                                
77. See Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 3 (listing a series of questions
concerning “gray” areas of the law pertaining to suitability obligations and online
brokerages).
Some of these questions include the following:  (1) Is it a recommendation if a
broker makes research and other information available to a customer based on
information gathered through profiling that customer from his movements online,
and (2) Does an investor assume that information received from a broker constitutes
a recommendation?  See id.; see also Jane Bryant Quinn, What Some Online Brokerages
Don’t Tell You, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at H2 (explaining that in response to
online trading securities, regulators are looking into whether there should be new
investor protection rules); Can SEC.gov Regulate Securities.com, supra note 3, at 1
(discussing that a goal of the SEC Commissioner is to examine how the Internet is
changing the securities industry and how the SEC can protect investors without
impeding innovation).
78. See Bell, supra note 3, at *1 (explaining the nature of customer online
suitability claims against e-brokers).
79. See Laura Unger, Remarks at the Conference on Integrating Technological
Advances for Online Brokerages, New York, New York, Regulating on Internet Time
(Sept. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Regulating on Internet Time] (stating that online brokers
believe that they do not have any suitability obligations because customers control
and direct their own investment decisions), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speeches/spch298.htm; see also RJ, supra note 12 (asserting that online brokers
like E*Trade, Ameritrade and Charles Schwab believe suitability obligations do not
attach to its online services).
80. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 29 (discussing possible ways that online brokers
disseminate what could constitute personalized information, and how these practices
may affect suitability obligations).
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securities, including newcomers to the investing arena.81  An
examination of online brokers’ advertisements shows that online
brokers may be targeting new, unsophisticated investors.82
Additionally, online brokers’ advertising encourages frequent
trading, which highlights the conflict between an online brokers’
obligation to investors and its desire to increase firm revenue.83
Second, in the online environment, determining when a broker
makes a recommendation under NASD Rule 2310 is difficult.84  This
determination affects what transactions, and thus what investors,
receive the protections provided by the NASD’s suitability rule.  Many
online brokers argue that no suitability obligations arise when
investors place orders electronically because online brokers do not
make recommendations.85  In discussing what constitutes a
recommendation, however, the NASD has stated that an analysis of
all the relevant facts and circumstances is necessary to determine if a
                                                                
81. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
82. See Schulz, supra note 8, at 242 (noting that Internet firms market to the
masses and firms should know they may attract inexperienced investors); see also infra
Part II.B (discussing online brokers’ aggressive advertising campaigns that appear to
target unsophisticated investors).
83. See Does the Internet Empower, supra note 8, at 3-4 (“Because higher trading
velocity is still tied to the bottom line of an online broker that depends on
transactional revenue, there is an inherent conflict between online brokers’ interest
in investors trading more often and investors’ interests in trading less often.”); see also
Plain Talk About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at 1098 (noting that the cardinal rule
for brokers, whether traditional or online, is to act in the customer’s interest).
84. See Wolensky, supra note 8, at 257 (noting that the NASD has refused to
define the term “recommendation” as used in Rule 2310); see also Customer
Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the difficulty of determining when a
broker makes an online recommendation); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 28 (“[W]hen
does a firm make a recommendation on-line?”).
85. See Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that
impersonal information found on a broker’s website does not constitute a
recommendation).
Charles Schwab’s Chief Counsel concluded that:  (1) a broker is not required to
analyze the suitability of an investor’s decision when the investor makes an
unsolicited securities order, either through the Internet or otherwise; (2) the type of
impersonal information found on a broker’s website does not constitute a
recommendation and does not impose a responsibility to monitor the customer’s
investment selection; and (3) an NASD requirement to review trades placed online
would diminish the advantages to trading online for investors.  See Suitability
Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 1; see also Simon & Buckman, supra
note 8, at C1 (explaining that discount brokers argue that suitability obligations do
not apply to them online because they do not have stockbrokers that recommend
specific stocks to customers).
Online brokers believe that consumers are making their own investment decisions
when investing online and, thus, no suitability obligations should attach.
Commissioner Unger agrees that mere order execution online most likely does not
create a suitability obligation. When online brokers provide personalized
information that a customer sees online, however, Commissioner Unger believes that
online brokers may have suitability obligations.  See Regulating on Internet Time, supra
note 79, at 5.
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broker made a recommendation.86  With online trading, these facts
and circumstances will often center around the information found on
an online broker’s Internet Website.87
A. The Type of Investor that Online Trading Attracts
Online trading often attracts smaller, unsophisticated investors
because online trading is inexpensive and frequently has lower
account minimums than traditional brokerage firms.88  Although the
increased accessibility to securities markets provided by online
trading can be beneficial to investors, unsophisticated investors are
more vulnerable to financial losses when they direct their own
transactions online.89  For example, unsophisticated investors may use
online trading to undertake investments that are too risky for their
financial situation by purchasing stocks that are not suitable for
them.90  Additionally, many online investors, even unsophisticated
ones, trade on margin, which heightens the level of risk.91
Fortuitously, the stock market has flourished in recent years and, as a
                                                                
86. See Wolensky, supra note 8, at 258 (discussing Clarification of Notice to
Members 96-60 (Mar. 1997)).
87. Cf. id. at 261 (discussing that the information available on a broker’s website
and its impact on creating a recommendation).
88. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 242 (stating that in terms of raw numbers, there
are probably more naïve investors participating in the securities markets today than
ever before); Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C19 (stating that unsophisticated
investors are flocking to the Internet to invest and the NASD is concerned about
investor protection); Wolensky, supra note 8, at 253 (“The past few years have seen a
dramatic increase in the number of small investors who have become ‘on-line
traders’ eager to test their investment ability with ready market access.”); see also
Lipton, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that online trading has vastly expanded
investment opportunities for the average investor); cf. Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 12
(noting a study reporting that online stock investors are younger and more affluent
than customers at traditional, full service firms); supra text accompanying note 7
(discussing the definition of an unsophisticated investor).
89. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 242 (explaining that trades placed online do not
utilize a stockbroker and, thus, Internet firms have basically eliminated the one
safeguard for many investors); RJ, supra note 12 (comparing do-it-yourself,
unsophisticated online investors selecting stocks to customers selecting their own
drugs in a self-service pharmacy).
90. See Lipton, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that small investors, on occasion,
select securities trading strategies that are too risky for them and are not basing
investment decisions on the underlying fundamentals of a company, which can result
in purchasing securities that are not appropriate for them); RJ, supra note 12
(quoting NASAA’s president, Mr. Skolnick, who states “despite the record number of
people investing, financial literacy remains dangerously low”).
91. See Lisa Reilly Cullen, The Margin-Debt Hole:  How Deep Is Too Deep? Borrowing
Money to Play the Stock Market Is Both Alluring and Dangerous, M ONEY MAG., Apr. 1, 2000,
at 135 (discussing that when investors start trading online they tend to trade more
frequently and hold higher margin balances, in large part because it is so easy to
open an account online and start trading on margin); see also infra notes 7, 15 and
accompanying text (discussing investor sophistication and trading securities on
margin).
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result, investors have experienced increased gains and fewer losses.92
If the market falls, however, many unsophisticated investors may
experience financial ruin because they held investments that were
too risky for their financial situations.93
Exacerbating potential hazards for unsophisticated online investors
are certain phenomena that occur when investors trade online.  A
recent study explains that online investors tend to be overconfident
in their trading ability94 due, in part, to an illusion of knowledge and
control.95  As a result, online investors tend to be overly self-attributive
of their successes, especially in light of the market’s recent
                                                                
92. See RJ, supra note 12 (reporting that the long bull market, along with media
coverage and advertising, have created a “speculative fervor” among investors); David
Segal, Investors Are Trading Brokers for Computers; By Going Online, Wall Street Is Just a
Keystroke Away, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1999, at A6 (noting that some in the industry
believe that the market has been so positive in the past seven years that virtually
anyone can turn a profit); see also Paul Lim, The Virtual Trade, at 2 (visited Nov. 14,
2000) (noting that the recent bull market is enabling even novice traders to earn
20% on their funds invested in the stock market), available at http://www.money.
com/money/onlineinvesting/trading/trade1.html.
93. See Does the Internet Empower, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that in today’s strong
stock market investors “feel impervious to risk”); Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Where No
Investor Has Gone Before; Amateurs Steered the Ship Through a Spacey Year, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 1999, at H12 (noting that individual investors may be too optimistic about the
stock market’s performance and not take into account the fact that the market will
likely decline at some point); see also Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C19
(explaining that suitability obligations for online brokers will become important after
the market takes a nose dive); E-Trade’s Growing Pains, supra note 5, at H1 (discussing
one investor’s story of severe financial loss after becoming an E*Trade customer
because the investor said “the constant advertising, the enticement of margin, [and]
the ability to do it at home sucked me right in”); cf. Burns, supra note 20, at 1
(reporting on a statement by SEC Commissioner Unger that she is uncertain about
the future of the online brokerage industry should the market take a downturn).
94. Researchers found this overconfidence and illusion of control is a product of
the vast amounts of financial information available on the Internet combined with
the power of being able to execute trades with a click of the mouse.  See Barber &
Odean, supra note 43, at 6-8.  Online brokers often promote the quantity of financial
information on their Web page and state that the information provided is the same
as that reviewed by professional brokers.  See id. at 6.  For example, one online
broker’s advertisement states that “you’ll make more, because you know more.”  Id.
Even though there is a lot of information online, the study notes that online
customers do not have the same training and experience as professional brokers.  See
id.  Online customers, however, become overconfident because they confuse the
availability of the information with knowledge.  See id.; see also Online Trading:  New
Online Traders Vulnerable to Overconfidence, UC Davis Scholars Find, 31 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1213, 1213 (Sept. 17, 1999) [hereinafter New Online Traders Vulnerable to
Overconfidence] (repeating the study’s conclusions that excessive information creates
an illusion of overconfidence); Leslie Walker, Online Traders’ Net Impact on the Increase,
WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1998, at E1 (discussing online investor behavior).
95. See Fred Barbash, Investing Online?  It’s Going to Cost You, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
1999, at H1 (discussing the researchers’ study); Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 6-
7 (noting that online brokers’ advertisements bolster investors’ illusion of knowledge
and control); New Online Traders Vulnerable to Overconfidence, supra note 94, at 1213
(discussing the conclusions reached in the Odean and Barber study).
BARNETTPPREVISED21401.DOC 6/18/2001  1:07 PM
1110 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1089
prosperity.96
The result of these online investing characteristics is that online
investors were more profitable investors prior to opening online
accounts.97  One study showed investor accounts went from
outperforming the market by 2.4% when they were investing offline
to underperforming the market by about 3.5% after they switched to
online trading.98  One reason for this decline appears to be that once
investors go online, they tend to “trade more actively, more
speculatively and less profitably.”99  Another factor that may influence
online investors’ trading choices is online brokers’ advertising.100
B. Online Brokers’ Aggressive Advertising Campaigns
Online brokers’ extensive advertising campaigns appear to target
the average American.101  Therefore, online brokers know, or should
know, they will attract unsophisticated investors, as well as
knowledgeable, experienced investors.102 Online brokers’ television
                                                                
96. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 2; New Online Traders Vulnerable to
Overconfidence, supra note 94, at 1213 (reporting investors’ mistake in crediting
themselves for trading success when luck deserves the credit).
97. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 2 (explaining that the investors in the
study that switched from phone-based trading to online trading performed more
poorly because they became overconfident in their investing ability); see also Barbash,
supra note 95, at H1 (admitting that personal overconfidence resulted in poor albeit
not disastrous returns); New Online Traders Vulnerable to Overconfidence, supra note 94,
at 1213 (quoting Odean and Barber’s assertions of lagging online profits).
98. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 4 (discussing that online investors’
worsening performance does not seem to rationally follow the benefits purportedly
gained by trading online such as lower trading costs, improved execution speed, and
increased accessibility to market information); see also Barbash, supra note 95, at H1
(discussing the statistical underperformance of online investors).
99. Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at Abstract; see Does the Internet Empower, supra
note 8, at 2 (questioning whether online investor excitement and frequency of trades
is prudent); New Online Traders Vulnerable to Overconfidence, supra note 94, at 1213
(discussing trends in online investing where investors, excited by the plethora of
information available to them online, tend to trade more frequently); cf. Ianthe
Jeanne Dugan, Online Trading Fees Headed Lower, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1999, at E1
(discussing that some analysts believe investors “will realize that rapid-fire trading is
self-defeating” and the novelty of the online trading may start to wear off).
100. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 1 (discussing online brokers’
advertisements).
101. See Sugawara, supra note 5, at E1, E2 (citing a recent Lehman Brothers Inc.
report stating that in fiscal year 2000 the eight largest online brokers combined will
spend an expected $1.2 billion on advertising).
102. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 242 (noting that online firms market to the masses
so that they should know that they will attract a spectrum of investors, some
inexperienced, others experienced).  Online brokers also should know the nature of
their customers because every time a customer opens an account with a broker, the
customer is asked to provide information about their net worth, trading history, and
investment goals.  See id. at 240.  The securities rules require brokers to gather this
information.  See id. (suggesting that this requirement is in place so that brokers can
meet suitability obligations).
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and print advertisements assert that online trading is easy, convenient
and profitable.103  Thus, even though online brokers’ advertisements
solicit individuals of all sophistication levels to trade online, nothing
about online brokers’ systems or business practices distinguishes
between novice and sophisticated investors.104
Many online brokers’ advertisements seem to encourage a get rich
quick mentality.105  Chairman Levitt stated many online trading ads
“border on irresponsibility” and “resemble commercials for the
lottery.”106  These types of online broker advertisements indicate that
                                                                
103. See Beth Burkstrand, Online Investing:  A Consumer Guide; Taking the Trading
Floor to the Home Front; Choosing the Right Broker on the Internet Isn’t Always Easy, WASH.
POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at H1 (stating that television Internet brokerage advertisements
convince “wanna-be Warren Buffets” that they can easily “point and click their way to
an online fortune by simply forking over a $10 bill to one of the many firms that now
have homes on the Net”); James K. Glassman, Internet Is Ideal For a “Fun” Account,
WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1998, at H1 (stating that “online trading makes buying and
selling securities look easy, fast and cheap”); see also Barber & Odean, supra note 43,
at 1 (discussing examples of online brokers’ advertisements).
For example, many online broker advertisements cater to the average American’s
“do-it-yourself” mentality and general distrust of Wall Street’s traditional brokerage
structure, which many perceive as being available only for very wealthy investors.  See
Segal, supra note 92, at A1 (noting that in decades past Americans thought that Wall
Street was a “bewildering jungle”); Walker, supra note 94, at E1 (discussing that with
online trading, more average Americans are now starting to be active traders whereas
previously typical active traders were wealthy individuals and institutional investors);
see also Barbash, supra note 95, at H1 (explaining that part of the reason that
investors are drawn to online trading is because it is fun for investors to do it
themselves).  Recent online trading advertisements epitomize this trend.  See, e.g.,
Discover Brokerage, in BARRONS MAG., Sept. 6, 1999, at 29 (advertisement) (showing
an average looking woman watering her flowers with a slogan that reads “If Pros Can
Trade After The Market Closes Why Can’t Joan?”); Ameritrade, in BARRONS MAG.,
Sept. 20, 1999, at 17 (advertisement) (displaying a slogan that reads “After trying
several different brokers, I finally found a stock market whiz. Me.”).  The
advertisement continues:  “You can pick stocks with the best of them.  All you need is
a computer and Ameritrade.  We give you the same research tools that many
professionals use.  So it is easy to gain the knowledge you need to make the right
picks.”  Id.
104. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 242 (stating that online brokers market to the
masses, but their business practices do not make any allowances for the different
types of investors that they attract).
105. See Walter Hamilton, Securities Chief Slams TV Ads on Online Investing
Consumers, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1999, at A1 (outlining recent criticisms of the get-rich
quick mentality pervasive in online trading ads); see also Barber & Odean, supra note
43, at 1 (describing the “sudden wealth” connotations of advertisements).
106. See Ann Monroe, Regulators to the Internet:  No Gamblers Wanted, INV. DEALERS’
DIG., June 21, 1999 (recounting the SEC chairman’s scrutiny of online brokerage
advertising), available at 1999 WL 19513991; Plain Talk About Online Investing, supra
note 6, at 1099 (commenting that when brokerage firms “create grandiose and
unrealistic expectations” they expose themselves to disgruntled customers, who will
be unhappy when their expectations are not met).
In addition, Bradely Skolnik, Indiana Securities Commissioner and NASAA’s
president, noted that many online trading ads encourage investors to actively trade
their own accounts, a strategy that is not appropriate for most investors. See
Bloomberg News, Online Trading Ads Under Scrutiny (visited Nov. 14, 2000)
[hereinafter Online Trading Ads Under Scrutiny] (“These ads seem to be encouraging
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just using an online broker and trading frequently will result in
profits.107
The NASD recognizes the potential abuses that can occur through
advertising, and thus the need for its regulation.  In addition to
NASD Rule 2210,108 which governs “Communications with the
Public,” the NASD has more specifically examined the interplay
between advertising and the “recommendation” of a day-trading
strategy.109  Although the final day-trading rules do not define the
term “promoting a day-trading strategy,” the proposed version of the
rules directly indicated that a firm’s advertising could be a factor in
determining the recommendation of a day-trading strategy.110  Even
                                                                
you to engage in activity that would be downright wrongful if your broker
recommended it.”), available at http://news.cnet.com/category/0-1007-200-
341647.html.  Skolnik explains that most investors should invest in longer-term
investments, but the “not-so-subliminal” message of some online broker
advertisements is that customers should trade frequently. See id. (lamenting the
“trade, trade, trade” mentality).
107. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 1 (discussing examples where online
advertisements assure inexperienced investors that they can trade online and infer
that they will become wealthy fast if they trade frequently).
For example, one well known industry television advertisement for Discover
Brokerage Direct promotes the idea that any average person can open an online
brokerage account and trade their way to riches.  See Barber & Odean, supra note 43,
at 1 (describing Discover’s “two truck” advertisement); Online Trading Ads Under
Scrutiny, supra note 106.  In this advertisement a tow truck driver is towing a
businessman’s car and a conversation ensues as the businessman hitches a ride in the
tow truck. See id.  The conversation centers around the tow truck driver’s recently
purchased island (that turns out to be its own country), which he bought with his
online investing proceeds.  See id.  Discover Brokerage Direct, now a part of Dean
Witter decided to take this advertisement off the air.  See Sugawara, supra note 5, at
caption under picture.
In another television advertisement, for Ameritrade, a woman is embarrassed that
she chose to invest in a mutual fund, which is typically a lower risk, longer term
investment, instead of selecting stocks via online trading.  See Plain Talk About On-Line
Investing, supra note 6, at 1100 (noting that the message sent by this type of
advertisement is that longer-term, diversified investments are undesirable).  One
television advertisement for E*Trade implies that any stock broker who must actually
work for a living must not be a very good broker.  See Barber & Odean, supra note 43,
at 1 (describing an E*Trade advertisement as suggesting that online trading requires
no work).
Even J. Joe Rickets, founder and chairman of Ameritrade, notes that trading
heavily is not something that makes investors a lot of money.  See David Whitford, Are
They Allies or Enemies? (visited Nov. 14, 2000) (discussing the inherent contradictions
of online trading’s popularity), available at http://www.money.com/money/archive/
magarticle/0,4015,8011,00.html.  Online brokers, like Ameritrade, generate a fee
each time a person trades using their website.  See id.  Therefore, online firms have
an obvious incentive to encourage frequent trading.  See id.
108. NASD Conduct Rule 2210, NASD Manual (CCH) 4171 (Aug. 2000).
109. See NASD Notice to Members 00-62, Day-Trading Rules (Sept. 2000)
(discussing the approval of the Day-Trading Rules:  (1) “Approval Procedures for
Day-Trading Accounts,” NASD Conduct Rule 2360 (Sept. 2000) (having an effective
date of October 16, 2000), and (2) “Day-Trading Risk Disclosure Statement,” NASD
Conduct Rule 2361 (Sept. 2000) (having an effective date of October 16, 2000)).
110. See NASD Notice 00-62, supra note 109, at n.2 (“The new rules do not define
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though the new rules are more vague on this issue, they leave open
the possibility that the NASD may determine that a firm is
“promoting a day-trading strategy” because of the firm’s
advertisements.111  In addition to broadcast, print and television
advertising, brokers’ Internet Web pages impact customers’ choices,
and thus, may require some form of regulation.
C. Online Brokers’ Websites:  What Should Constitute a Recommendation
Under NASD 2310?
Regulators acknowledge that recommendations may be more
complicated in the online environment where advice is provided
more subtly.112  Many online brokers’ Websites furnish information
that may constitute a recommendation.113  The NASD, in particular,
has recognized that communication media, such as the Internet or
electronic mail, can create recommendations.114  In September of
1996 the NASD distributed Notice to Members 96-60115 stating that:
[A] broad range of circumstances may cause a transaction to be
considered recommended, and this determination does not
                                                                
the term ‘promoting a day-trading strategy.’”).  But see NASD Notice to Members 99-
32, NASD Regulation Requests Comment On Proposed Rules Regarding Approval Procedures
For Day-Trading Accounts, Including Appropriateness Determinations, and Disclosure of Risks
of Day-Trading Activities (Apr. 15, 1999) (noting that, in addition to advertising, the
promotion of day trading training seminars and/or direct day trading outreach
programs may also constitute the “recommendation” of a day trading strategy).
A recommendation would occur if an individual, in response to such promotions,
decided to engage in a day trading strategy.  See id.  An additional indication that
illustrates that the firm generally promotes day trading strategies would be the fact
that other customers of the firm typically use a day trading strategy.  See id.
111. See NASD Notice 00-62, supra note 109, at n.2.
112. See Does the Internet Empower, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that some people may
argue that when a broker brings a security to the attention of a customer, a suitability
obligation is triggered); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 27 (questioning when online
brokers trip the recommendation threshold).
113. See Broker-Dealers:  Unger Says Online Brokers to Face Suitability, Liability Issues, 31
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 211, 211 (Feb. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Unger Says Online
Brokers to Face Suitability] (asserting that online brokers who provide information to
investors can be exposed to liability over suitability obligations).
Information found on an online broker’s Web page include stock screeners,
customized financial plans, and high-end Wall Street research, such as research
reports that have a buy or sell recommendation.  See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 16
(discussing that online brokers’ websites include features like comprehensive charts,
market data, securities analyses, customizable home pages, and interactive
calculators).  But see Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 1, 8
(discussing that brokerage firms, like Charles Schwab, only offer general, impersonal
information to customers through their websites, which does not trigger suitability
obligations because general information and advertisements are not
recommendations).
114. See NASD Notice to Members 96-60, Clarification of Members’ Suitability
Responsibilities Under NASD Rules with Special Emphasis on Member Activities in Speculative
and Low-Priced Securities (Sept. 1996).
115. See id.
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depend on the classification of the transaction by a particular
member as “solicited” or “nonsolicited.”  In particular, a
transaction will be considered to be recommended when the
member or its associated person brings a specific security to the
attention of the customer through any means, including, but not
limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery of
promotional material through the mail, or the transmission of
electronic messages.116
Because a recommendation can occur “through any means,”
information on a broker’s Website could constitute a
recommendation, but the more difficult issue is determining what
information creates a recommendation.117  Some of the offerings
found on many online brokers’ Websites that may create a
recommendation include research and investment tools for their
customers.118  In addition, many online broker sites provide at least
                                                                
116. Id.  After Notice 96-60 was issued, brokers remained concerned over what
they interpreted as an expansion in the suitability doctrine.  See Suitability Obligations
in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing the confusion over 96-32, its
withdrawal, and clarification by 96-60).  In 96-60, the inclusion of the word “will” in
the phrase “a transaction will be considered a recommendation” caused particular
confusion because it appears to determine that materials distributed on a specific
security creates a recommendation.  See id.  Therefore, mass distribution of general
information on a security may indeed constitute a recommendation.  See id. (noting
that this expansion of a recommendation potentially creates “an unprecedented
expansion of suitability obligations”).
In March of 1997, the NASD further tried to clarify their position in Clarification
of Notice to Members 96-60.  See NASD, For Your Information:  Clarification of Notice to
Members 96-60 (Mar. 3, 1997) [hereinafter 96-60 Clarification Notice], available at
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/9703fyi.txt. Here, the NASD stated that Notice 96-
60 intended to emphasize that recommendations could be made “in a variety of
ways” by providing examples of practices that may result in a recommendation.  See
id.
The NASD issued this clarification in response to industry concern that the
original Notice 96-60 expanded suitability obligations.  See id.; see also Suitability
Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing NASD’s guidance
regarding what is a recommendation).  The clarification stresses that Notice 96-60
was not intended to indicate that every mention of a security through the outlined
modes of communication constitutes a recommendation.  See 96-60 Clarification
Notice, supra; see also Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 14.
Instead the NASD emphasized that actions constituting a recommendation depend
on “relevant facts and circumstances.”  96-60 Clarification Notice, supra; Suitability
Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 14.
117. See NASD Notice 96-60, supra note 114.
118. Cf. Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 5-6.
The broker’s site may allow access to a variety of investing information,
directly on the website and/or through links to sites of third-party
information providers.  This information may include issuer financial
statements, industry outlook information, historical earnings data, consensus
issuer earning estimates, and consensus issuer and industry
recommendations.
Id.
See Kathy Berger, Helping Hand for Internet Investors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, at 56
(stating that Ameritrade President Michael Anderson cites suitability requirements as
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“generalized recommendations and ratings of specific securities.”119
In addition, brokers choose to provide information on some
securities, but neglect to provide information about others.120
Consequently, an investor, trusting his or her online broker, may
believe that a stock listed on the online broker’s Website is a wise
investment.121  Practically speaking, an online broker can also use the
placement and style of Internet icons and hyperlinks to make a
particular stock more attractive to site surfers.122  One important
factor in determining whether a recommendation has been made is
                                                                
the primary reason Ameritrade, unlike their competitors, refuses to offer their clients
a broader range of services).  Mindful that research offerings are an attractive and
potentially differentiating feature, one major firm chose to give away free research
for a limited period of time to attract customers.  See Customer Expectations Online,
supra note 3, at 3.
119. Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 6.  A broker-dealer
“website may provide stock selection tools, which allow investors to sort companies
based on criteria selected by the investor.”  Id.; see Miller, supra note 27, at 1
(explaining that online brokers use various techniques to inform online customers of
potential investments).
120. Brokerage firms have argued that when they present a customer with a variety
of stock choices, the brokerage firm is not responsible for the selection the customer
makes.  See Schulz, supra note 4, at 240, 242.  This situation, however, would be like a
doctor lining up a row of medicines in front of his or her patient and disclaiming
responsibility for the result because the patient selected the prescription.  See id.
Brokerage firms argue that they are insulated from liability by opting for the
consumer choice format.  See id.; cf. Customer Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 4
(discussing potential liability related to hyperlinks, which is either an icon or text
that allows a Web user to connect to another document, because it may appear that
the linking party has adopted and approved the information viewed through the
hyperlink).
121. Cf. Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 30 (discussing that some believe that a
recommendation should depend on if the “customer reasonably believed that
information set to him took into account his ‘personal circumstances.’”).
A customer is not going to think that their broker would place information about a
“bad” stock on their website and unsophisticated investors, especially, may not
understand that different investors have different risk tolerances, and thus, some
stocks may be appropriate for other investors, but not necessarily appropriate for
them.  Cf. Customer Expectations Online, supra note 113, at 3 (noting online
investor/broker relationships are based on “convenience, access, and trust”).
122. See Whitford, supra note 107 (discussing that everything about the online
investing experience is geared toward creating profits for the online broker,
including the colorful graphics because the online brokers make money per
transaction and therefore want to encourage customers to trade every time they visit
their site). But see Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 8
(asserting that the reports and other information available on websites, while making
the sites more attractive to consumers, are not specifically tailored to any particular
type of investor).
Online brokers argue that online investors are the ones who select which securities
they want to receive information about through pointing and clicking with their
mouse, thus indicating that brokers do not control the materials that the consumer
obtains.  See Schultz, supra note 4, at 240-42 (critiquing the consumer choice defense
to liability).  The placement of icons and hyperlinks, however, can certainly alter
where a customer decides to “surf.”  See Whitford, supra note 107 (discussing the
allure of colorful graphics and other broker website enticements).
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the personalized nature of the information provided to an investor.123
D. Personalized Investment Research
A recommendation must be made to a particular person,
therefore, as a broker makes its online information more
personalized it inches closer to the recommendation threshold.124
Chairman Levitt stated that “[a]ny firm, day trading or online, that
recommends a type of investment strategy or customizes research
should ensure that it is suitable for its customers.”125  The controversy
remains, however, as to what threshold a broker must cross to create
a recommendation.126
Online brokers argue that online information found on their
Websites cannot constitute a recommendation because online
investors use “pull” technology to gain access to information.127  “Pull”
technology means that the customer sets his or her preferences and
the online merchant sends the customer information tailored to
these preferences.128  Online brokers, however, are more likely to face
                                                                
123. See Regulating on Internet Time, supra note 79 (explaining that when an online
broker offers more than execution services and starts providing personalized
information, suitability obligations become more likely).
124. The increasingly personal investment guidance available through online
brokers’ websites illustrates that recommendations can occur online.  See Cyberspace,
supra note 2, at 20 (noting that some online brokers personalize website content for
each user); Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that a
recommendation can occur where a broker helps manage a portfolio online by
providing tools like benchmarks for the portfolio or asset allocation assessments);
Burns, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that online brokers may use customer information
to send unsolicited research reports to the customer that the broker believes the
customer may find of interest).
Providing online personal advice seems to contradict Charles Schwab’s claim made
in their Memorandum to the NASD and the NASDR entitled Suitability Obligation and
Internet Investing that Schwab’s website provides “only impersonal, general
endorsements distributed to the public at large.”  See Suitability Obligations in Internet
Investing, supra note 2, at 1.  Schwab argued that no suitability obligations were
appropriate because the information on their website was impersonal in nature.  See
id.; cf. Longo, supra note 25, at 162 (discussing that the next planned push for firms
like Charles Schwab, T. Rowe Price and Vanguard is to develop software that allows
customers to receive customized advice and a streamline financial plan from the
broker’s website).
125. Plain Talk About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at 1101.
126. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 32 (outline a number of hypotheticals to
explore which facts and circumstances may constitute a recommendation online);
Customer Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 3-4 (offering scenarios to explore when
an online broker has crossed the threshold and made a recommendation).
127. See Can SEC.gov Regulate Securities.com, supra note 3, at 2 (questioning whether
suitability obligations should arise when online brokerage firms offer investor access
to information via “pull” technology).
128. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 21 (describing and giving an example of pull
technology); Customer Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing five different
scenarios of broker-investor information exchange via the Internet and stating that if
online investors solely control the information that they view, then there is a stronger
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a suitability obligation if its site utilizes “push” technology.  With
“push” technology the online merchant creates a user profile by
monitoring a user’s activities online.129  Using this information, the
merchant can direct certain information to the customer.130  In this
case, the investor is still clicking on certain information from the
Web, but the online broker has personalized the information
available.131  Furthermore, the investor may not even know that the
broker has personalized the site.132
For example, brokerage firms, both online and traditional,
“segment” investors into particular investment types after collecting
information from them.133  This practice of segmenting investors may
occur using technology known as data mining.134  “Data mining
enables brokerage firms to track a customer[’s] behavior, both in the
securities[,] and depending on the firms affiliates[,] the non-
securities context.”135  An online firm could use this research to target
information toward a specific investor or group of investors.136  One
                                                                
argument that online brokers are acting only as order takers).
129. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 21 (addressing online merchants’ ability to
“track the clickstream” to classify consumers and recommend certain products).
Online brokers can collect information from customers in a variety of ways.  See
Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 3.  First, customers may enter their
personal information, such as their age, risk tolerance and savings, via the Internet.
See id.  In fact, customers often have to enter this type of information to open an
online trading account.  See id.  Second, online brokers may collect information by
monitoring what information a customer selects while on their website.  See id. A
broker can even monitor what other websites a customer visits by use of a “cookie,”
which is a device that is stored on a visitor’s browser and stores information about the
customer’s activities online.  See id.; see also David Whalen, The Official Cookie FAQ
(visited Nov. 14, 2000) (explaining the function and purpose of “cookies”), available
at http://www.cookiecentral.com/faq.  “Cookies can store database information,
custom page settings, or just about anything that would make a site individual and
customizable.”  Id.
130. See id. See, e.g., Customer Expectations Online, supra note 113, at 1 (noting that
an online broker can tell what stocks a customer may be interested in purchasing
because they can tell when a customer checks a stock price over the Internet,
whereas previously a broker could not tell what stock quotes a customer checked in
the newspaper, so they could not use this information to further encourage the
purchase of the viewed stock).
131. See Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 4 (posing examples of how
online brokers could personalize via website profiling).
132. See Whalen, supra note 129 (describing the unsuspecting way websites “mark”
visitors with cookies).
133. See Regulating on Internet Time, supra note 79 (discussing a 1998 Deloitte and
Touche survey that found that 100% of full-service firms, 62% of full-discount firms,
and 43% of deep-discount firms “segmented” customers).
134. See Laura Unger, Remarks Before the Securities Industry Association, Palm
Desert, California, Technology Bytes the Securities Industry:  The New Millennium Brings
New Investors and New Markets (Mar. 14, 2000) [hereinafter The New Millennium]
(discussing that data mining adds a new dimension to the discussion of suitability
obligations online), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch354.htm.
135. Id.
136. See id.
BARNETTPPREVISED21401.DOC 6/18/2001  1:07 PM
1118 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1089
example of this type of technology’s application is that an online
broker may find that an investor tends to buy blue-chip stocks after its
price falls.137  In response to this information, a broker may send an e-
mail to the customer informing him or her that the price of a given
blue-chip stock has fallen.138  Determining whether this type of
personalized information would constitute a recommendation would
depend on how finely a broker segmented and distributed
information to customers.139  If an online broker sends this type of
information to one customer, this conduct should constitute a
recommendation.
Technology, like data mining, will most likely become more
prevalent in the future.  Industry analysts expect that the online
research found on brokers’ Websites will become increasingly
personalized.140  Securities and Exchange Commissioner, Laura
Unger, noted that the future value for online firms is in providing
personalized advice to investors.141  As the online brokerage industry
becomes even more competitive, providing commodities such as
basic research, information, and the execution of trades will not be
enough for an online broker to survive.142
E. Additional Factors that may Impact the Creation of a Recommendation
In addition to the personalized nature of information provided to
customers, there are other factors that will also impact the
determination of when a broker, whether online or traditional,
                                                                
137. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 23 (providing examples of how brokers can
discover information about investors by monitoring customer activities online).
138. See id. (explaining how brokers can use the information they gather on
investors to provide personalized information to the investors).
139. See The New Millennium, supra note 134, at 3 (the smaller and more specific
the targeted group, the more likely a recommendation would occur).  See generally
Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that determining whether
there is a recommendation depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the
situation).
140. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 22 (discussing firms’ inevitable use of
increasingly customized information to compete); Customer Exceptions Online, supra
note 3, at 3 (forecasting that brokers will benefit from customizing the information
they provide to customers); Regulating on Internet Time, supra note 79.
141. See Customer Exceptions Online, supra note 3, at 3 (commenting on predictions
for the increase of personalized information for investors); Unger Says Online Brokers
To Face Suitability, Liability Issues, supra note 113, at 211 (discussing the prediction of
Laura S. Unger, SEC Commissioner, that online brokerage firms will provide
increasingly personalized information to customers); see Regulating on Internet Time,
supra note 79 (noting that one firm is holding off on developing new products for
customers until suitability obligations become more clear).
142. See Unger Says Online Brokers to Face Suitability, supra note 113, at 211 (reporting
that personalized advice for investors will be of utmost importance for online
brokerage firms).
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makes a recommendation.143  For example, the investor’s
sophistication level is important.144  Less sophisticated investors may
be more likely to believe that information provided by a broker is a
recommendation and less able to analyze the information for
themselves.145  How the brokerage firm advertises its services is
another factor that may be considered.146  For example, if a firm
advertises itself as a discount operation that only takes orders and
provides little to no personalized information on its Internet site,
then they would be less likely to be viewed by either sophisticated or
unsophisticated investors as a firm that makes recommendations to
customers.147
III. ADEQUATELY PROTECTING INVESTORS:  THE NEED FOR SUITABILITY
CHECKS, INVESTOR EDUCATION AND WARNING LABELS
One purpose of securities regulation is to protect investors.148
Protecting investors boosts investor confidence in the securities
market which, in turn, encourages investment and capital
formation.149  The online brokerage industry creates a challenge for
                                                                
143. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 240-42 (explaining that brokers consider the
sophistication level and life circumstances of a client when making
recommendations).
144. See id. at 242 (describing how client knowledge and understanding impacts a
broker’s recommendation).
145. See id. (stating that naïve online investors may have very little understanding
of Internet trading).
146. See id. at 241 (discussing the responsibilities that accompany advertising
expansive services); see also Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1 (noting that
discount and utility brokers claim that, unlike full service brokers, they do not
provide investment advice, either online or otherwise, and thus are not subject to
suitability obligations).
147. Commissioner Unger notes that even though full service and discount
brokers traditionally offered very different levels of service to their customers, in
today’s market they provide many of the same types of services.  The differences
between full service brokers and discount brokers is lessening now that full service
firms have launched online broker sites.  For example, Merrill Lynch says it will
continue to meet suitability requirements online by monitoring customer accounts
and stopping excessive or inappropriate trades when necessary.  See Customer
Expectations Online, supra note 3, at 1 (commenting on the similarity of services
offered by discount and full service firms); Simon & Buckman, supra note 8, at C1
(noting that Merrill Lynch’s approach to online trading, which includes monitoring
customer trades, will provide consumers with more protection, but will subject
Merrill Lynch to more liability because investors who lose money will be likely to
hold the firm responsible).
148. See Arthur Levitt, Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century Marketplace, Speech
at the Securities Association Annual Meeting (Nov. 6, 1998) (explaining that one of
the fundamental reasons to regulate securities markets is to protect investors),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch225.htm; Regulating on Internet
Time, supra note 79 (“The Commission’s regulatory mandate is to protect investors
and to promote fair and efficient markerts.”).
149. See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers?  The Securities Investor Protection
Act, Investor Confidence and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1081
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regulators who want to adequately protect investors without stifling
innovation and potentially creating additional costs that could
diminish some of the benefits of online trading.  Investor protection,
however, is important for online investors particularly in light of
online brokers’ advertising and the proliferation of information on
their Web pages, which appears to result in online investor
overconfidence.150  Currently it is unclear if NASD rules adequately
protect online investors.  First, the NASD does not define the term
“recommendation” or outline what types of online activities
constitute a recommendation.151  Indeed the term “recommendation”
is difficult to apply in the online environment, but regulators need to
provide more finite guidance.152  Second, the NASD should require
brokers to perform suitability checks for unsophisticated investors
who place trades online.153  In addition, regulators should initiate a
number of other initiatives such as investor education and warning
labels to protect investors.154
                                                                
(1999) (discussing investor confidence in relation to the Securities Investor
Protection Act).
150. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 2-3 (discussing the development of
overconfidence among online investors); see also NASAA Task Force, supra note 11, at
612 (reporting on aggressive advertising campaigns and the false sense of confidence
they create in new investors).
Online trading has created a means to enable an increased number of individuals
to participate in securities markets; regulators must protect investors in order for
them to remain in the securities market.  See Buckman & Lucchetti, supra note 13, at
A1 (explaining that investors who lose large amounts of money trading stocks may
decide to sell everything and exit the market, as was seen after the 1987 market
crash).
151. See NASD Conduct Rule 2310, NASD Manual (CCH) 4261 (Apr. 1997)
(referring to the term “recommendation” three times but failing to provide a
definition); see also Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 13
(stating that the NASD has refrained from defining “recommendation,” and asking
that the NASD provide further guidance to clarify what constitutes a
recommendation for online brokers); Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 30 (concluding
from a survey that firms would like guidance on applying suitability requirements
online).  See generally Regulating on Internet Time, supra note 79, at 5 (explaining that
the best way to clarify suitability obligations online may be for regulators to provide
guidance on what is not a recommendation online).
152. See Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 3 (illustrating the
confusion and danger of not defining “recommendation”).
153. See generally Electronic Commerce:  Levitt Announces Increased Inspections,
Enforcement for Internet Brokerage Firms, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 593, 593 (May 7, 1999)
[hereinafter Levitt Announces Increased Inspections] (reporting that Levitt believes
online brokerage firms should receive greater scrutiny because of the risks they can
bring to investors and that new regulators may be necessary).
154. See James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now:  The Importance, Nature, Provision,
and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 157 (1998) (arguing
that the SEC should require more extensive disclosures and increase efforts to
educate investors).  See generally Regulating on Internet Time, supra note 79, at 1
(discussing that the SEC has a new investor education website at
www.sec.gov/invkhome.htm).
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A. Order Monitoring:  Suitability Checks for the Purchase and Sale of Stocks
Online by Unsophisticated Investors
In light of online brokers’ advertising, Web pages, and the
personalized information they provide to their often unsophisticated
customers, regulators should require suitability checks for
unsophisticated customers entering trades online.155  A suitability
check or suitability review is when an online broker monitors the
trades customers place online and stops the execution of any trades
that are unsuitable for a customer’s financial situation.156  Until
recently, securities regulators in Canada required all Canadian
brokers, both online and traditional, to monitor all orders placed by
their customers and guarantee that the transaction is suitable for the
investor.157  For each order placed, a broker employee, known as an
investment representative, would review the transaction in light of the
investor’s investment objectives and client profile.158
                                                                
155. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 242 (advocating that online brokerages should pay
more attention to the inexperienced, unsophisticated investor).  See generally
Michelle Clayton, Schwab Nixes Net Suitability, ON WALL ST., Mar. 1, 1999 (stating that
regulators are thinking about imposing suitability obligations on online brokers
because unsophisticated investors may be hurt by trading in volatile stocks), available
at 1999 WL 7285280.
The regulation of online brokers is essential to online investor protection
inasmuch as online brokerage firms have a financial interest in encouraging
customers to trade securities frequently.  See infra notes 83, 107 and accompanying
text.  Although this conflict is a concern for both online and traditional offline
brokers, online brokers are encouraging customers to engage in frequent trading in
an aggressive manner, while attempting to avoid suitability obligations.  See infra Part
II.B (discussing aggressive advertising that encourages frequent trading, even though
this activity may not be appropriate for most investors).
156. See Clayton, supra note 155; Suitability Obligations in Online Investing, supra note
2, at 15 (addressing suitability checks and reviews); Allyson Vaughan, Canadian IDA to
Press Regulators For Online Suitability Exemption, FIN. NET NEWS, July, 26, 1999
(discussing the Canadian laws that require online brokers to review orders for
suitability), available at 1999 WL 8881900.
157. See Katherine Macklem, Discount Brokers Push for New Trading Guidelines:  Waive
Vetting Rules:  Looking to Make Online Trading Fast and Cheaper, NAT’L POST, Apr. 8,
1999 (noting that both solicited and unsolicited orders must be reviewed in Canada),
available at 1999 WL 13670026; see also Clayton, supra note 156 (stating that Canada
requires online brokers to run a suitability check on all trades, unsolicited or
recommended); Vaughan, supra note 156 (explaining that the Canadian rules
require a manual review of every order entered on an online broker’s website).
After much pressure from the brokerage industry, the Canadian Securities
Administration is looking to relax the requirement that brokers must monitor all
trades for suitability. See Maklem, supra note 157 (explaining that suitability review is
required for each transaction in Canada).
The Canadian brokerage industry believes that the suitability rule must be
dropped to compete with the U.S. market, which does not currently have the same
type of regulator provision. See id. (reporting that brokers believe that dropping
Canada’s suitability rule will lower trading costs and improve execution speed).
158. See Maklem, supra note 157 (explaining that suitability review is required for
each transaction in Canada).
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Online brokers in the United States argue that suitability checks
will cause an increase in the price of online trading.159  Technology
and competition, however, would encourage online firms to find ways
to keep prices low while meeting a suitability review requirement.  In
fact, suitability review technology is already in existence.160  E*Trade
has been looking for a vendor to provide the online broker with
technology that would enable it to conduct suitability reviews of
online trades.161  Suitability review technology would use algorithms
and mathematical formulas to determine whether a specific trade is
appropriate for a particular customer.162  With this type of review,
online brokers could identify unsophisticated online investors
attempting to purchase securities that are too risky for their financial
position and notify the investors about their findings.163  Some
                                                                
159. See Vaughan, supra note 156 (reporting that online brokerage firms in
Canada are lobbying for an exception to the suitability rule because they cannot
compete with lower priced U.S. online brokers who are not required to run
suitability checks); Suitability Obligations in Internet Investing, supra note 2, at 15
(arguing that a suitability review or check would destroy some benefits of online
investing, such as low costs and fast execution of trades).
160. See Margaret McKegney, E*Trade Seeks Technology to Review Trade Suitability,
FIN. NET NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999 (noting that E*Trade is looking for a vendor with an
established track record to provide them with suitability review technology); The New
Millennium, supra note 134, at 3 (noting that some brokerage firms have been
developing algorithms to conduct a suitability analysis).
161. See McKegney, supra note 160 (discussing E*Trade’s belief that advice online
will be required to stay competitive, and thus, suitability obligations will become
applicable).
162. See id. (explaining that “securities could be ranked by risk and matched
electronically against a client’s annual income, objectives and net worth.”).
163. Cf. Lisa M. Bertain, “Economic Suicide” Claims:  An Emerging Trend in Securities
Arbitration, in 2 SEC. ARB. 1996, at 191 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. B-950, 1996) (noting the emerging trend in securities arbitration of
economic suicide claims in which an investor alleges the broker had a duty to
prevent the investor from making an unsuitable investment).
In economic suicide cases against a traditional broker, the customer essentially
asks the broker to save the customer from himself.  As online brokers, however,
engage in a number of activities to encourage the purchase of certain stocks and the
participation in certain types of trading strategies, the responsibility to stop investors
from engaging in unsuitable investments or trading strategies is even more
appropriate for online brokers.  See id. (explaining the nature of economic suicide
claims); see also Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 647 F.2d 165 (6th
Cir. 1981) (holding that a broker must act in the customer’s interest when
transacting business for a non-discretionary account holder); Duffy v. Cavalier, 264
Cal. Rptr. 740, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a fiduciary duty exists in every
broker-customer relationship, but that the scope of this duty will depend on the facts
of the case); Oliver v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., NASD 93-00656 (1994) (awarding
$10,000 to the claimant after he alleged that Schwab, a discount broker, breached its
fiduciary duty by permitting and failing to supervise the options trading in claimant’s
account); Peterzell v. Dean Witter Reynolds, AAA 32-136-0416-88-ID (1990) (holding
that the law imposes a fiduciary duty on brokerages, even in non-discretionary
accounts).  But see Wasnick v. Refco, Inc., 911 F.2d 345, 350 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[There
is] no duty by brokers to prevent emotionally or financially unstable client from
trading on non-discretionary accounts.”).
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industry participants believe that online technology enables brokers
to assess customer suitability more easily than if a customer traded via
a traditional broker.164  Additionally, online brokers would only be
required to run these suitability checks on a portion of their
customers who are classified as unsophisticated.165  This limitation will
reduce the additional costs that online brokers anticipate as a result
of running suitability checks.166  Furthermore, it is arguably better for
online investors and the economy as a whole to pay slightly higher
prices in exchange for suitability checks, which provide investor
protection and promote investor confidence.167
B. Consumer Education:  One Important Step Toward Promoting Smart
Online Investing
To make smart investment decisions for themselves, online
investors must be educated about capital markets and investing
strategies.168  Accordingly, the SEC has initiated a campaign to
educate consumers about investing.169  Chairman Levitt remarks that
there are common misconceptions surrounding online trading.170
For example, online investors may believe that simply selecting stocks
                                                                
164. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 28 (discussing that technology facilitates
suitability determinations).
165. See Schulz, supra note 4, at 240-42 (illustrating why unsophisticated investors
need more guidance than sophisticated investors).
166. Another factor that will keep the cost of suitability checks down is the fact
that online brokers already have information about their customers that will enable
them to make a decision as to the customer’s sophistication level.  Securities rules
already require online brokerage firms to collect information such as their net worth,
trading history, and investment goals when a customer wants to open an online
trading account.  These requirements already enable brokerage firms to meet
suitability requirements.  Therefore, online firms will not have to expend additional
resources to obtain customer information necessary to accomplish suitability checks.
See generally Schulz, supra note 4, at 240 (explaining that online brokers are required
to learn basic information about their investors before opening online accounts).
167. See Barber & Odean, supra note 43, at 2 (discussing that the growth of online
trading has produced benefits to investors, such as lower fees, but that benefits are
diminished by the fact that online investing encourages disadvantageous and
inappropriate trading strategies).  The Barber and Odean study found that lower
commissions actually encouraged excessive, speculative trading.  See id. (explaining
that lower fees and faster service create an incentive to trade without forethought).
168. See Cyberspace, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that investor education is critical to
investor protection); Fanto, supra note 154, at 107 (arguing that investor education is
important given the increasingly predominant role investing plays in Americans’
lives).
The goal of investor education should be to educate an investor to the point where
they can understand how to invest to achieve an optimal portfolio.  An educated
consumer should be able to evaluate financial information and make intelligent
financial decisions.  See id. at 131-35.
169. See id. at 156 (evaluating the SEC’s investor education initiatives).
170. See Plain Talk About On-line Investing, supra note 6, at 1095 (stating that the
fundamentals of investing still apply to online investing).
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online will make them money.171  To combat online investing
misconceptions, the SEC has created an Investor Education Web
Page, which includes a variety of information pertaining to Internet
investing.172  In addition, Chairman Levitt has asked that all online
brokers create a link from their Website to the SEC’s Investor
Education Web Page.173  The NASD also provides investor
information on its Website.174  Investor education, however, is but one
aspect of a comprehensive solution to online investor protection,
especially in light of online brokers’ powerful advertising campaigns.
C. Adequate Warning Labels and Disclosure
Some online firms post disclaimers stating they are not
recommending any of the securities discussed on their Website.175
Typically, firms place these disclaimers somewhere on the broker’s
Website and/or attach them to account opening information.176  The
SEC, however, in a report to Congress in March of 1999, stated that
online brokers place such disclaimers on their Web pages to insulate
themselves from liability and not to inform customers of the potential
risks and hazards of using online trading services.177
To alert online investors about the potential pitfalls associated with
online trading, one solution would be for the NASD to require that
online brokers place warning labels prominently on their Internet
Websites.178  Recognizing the benefits of warning labels, the NASD has
included a warning label requirement in the recently approved day
                                                                
171. See id.; see also supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing that
investors become overconfident and overly self-attributive when they began trading
online).
172. See id. at 1101 n.6 (discussing the SEC’s new Investor Education Web Page
located at www.sec.gov/invkhome.htm).
173. See id.
174. See http://www.investor.nasd.com/iresc/c-iresc07.html (visited Nov. 14,
2000).
175. See Levitt Announces Increased Inspections, supra note 153, at 593 (explaining
that in May of 1999 Levitt sent letter to all online brokers asking them to improve the
quality of their disclosures).  See, e.g., E*Trade homepage (visited Nov. 14, 2000), at
http://www.etrade.com/cgibin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+Home?gxml=hpa_useragreement.
html; Ameritrade Homepage (visited Nov. 14, 2000), at http://www.ameritrade.
com/getting_started/apply_online.html.
176. See id. (providing examples of disclaimers).
177. See Todd Woody, Time To Regulate Greed?, INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 17-24,
1999, at 55 (discussing the need to regulate online brokers).  The NASD has
considered attaching a suitability notice to any customized research available on
specific securities.  See Charles Gasparino & Michael Schroeder, SEC Steps Up Oversight
of Online Brokerages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1999, at C1.
178. At a minimum, online brokers should better communicate what it means to
trade on margin, an increasingly popular practice online, that may be inappropriate
for many smaller, less sophisticated investors.
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trading rules.179  The rule requires firms promoting a day-trading
strategy to deliver a disclosure statement to customers before they
open an account.180  A similar rule requiring online brokers to
provide a disclosure statement to customers, including an
explanation of the allocation of broker and customer responsibility,
would be useful.
CONCLUSION
Online trading has enabled increased access to the securities
market.  Encouraging investment in securities can be good for both
individual investors and the economy as a whole.  Yet to preserve the
benefits created by online trading, investor protection is imperative.
One aspect of this protection is the clarification of suitability
obligations online.  The difficulty in determining what constitutes a
recommendation online makes investor protection difficult.  This
difficulty is further complicated by online brokers’ aggressive
advertising campaigns.
Unsophisticated investors are particularly vulnerable to the
potential pitfalls of online trading.  Therefore, to encourage these
investors to continue participating in the securities market for the
long term, they should be protected now through the use of
suitability checks for all the orders they place online.  In addition to
suitability checks, regulators should continue investor education
initiatives and strongly encourage online brokers to better educate
their customers.
                                                                
179. See NASD Rule 2361 (outlining the required “day-trading risk disclosure
statement.”).
180. See id. (explaining that the firm can deliver the statement electronically or in
writing).
